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Professional Sports, Hurricane Katrina, and the Economic 
Redevelopment of New Orleans1
Robert A. Baade and Victor A. Matheson
Introduction
Hurricane Katrina devastated New Orleans physically and economically after 
making landfall on August 29, 2005. Full recovery, which generally follows na-
tural catastrophes in the United States given the inflow of funds for recon-
struction, seems less certain in the Crescent City. Citizens and businesses that 
left New Orleans following the storm have exhibited a reluctance to return. 
The city’s professional sports teams are included among those enterprises that 
departed New Orleans in the wake of Hurricane Katrina. The National Football 
League (NFL) Saints played home games in three different cities (San Antonio, 
Baton Rouge, and New York City) during 2005. The National Basketball Associa-
tion (NBA) Hornets took up residence in Oklahoma City for 35 of their 41 home 
games during the 2005/06 season, returning to Louisiana (although playing in 
Baton Rouge and not New Orleans) for a largely symbolic six games. The Arena 
Football League’s Voodoo abandoned their entire 2006 schedule. The Universi-
ty of New Orleans and Tulane, both National Collegiate Athletic Association 
(NCAA) Division 1 schools, either canceled entire seasons for individual sports 
or played “barnstorming” seasons with no home games.
What is the future of professional and spectator sports in New Orleans, 
and what roles do sports play in the economic redevelopment of the city? The 
purpose of this paper is to analyze the extent to which the city of New Orleans 
should direct its redevelopment dollars toward its sports infrastructure. Has 
New Orleans benefited economically from its role as host to major professional 
1 Reprinted with permission of the Western Economic Association. The paper originally appeared in Contemporary 
Economic Policy, Vol. 25, No. 4, pp. 591–603.
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sports teams and a disproportionate number of mega-sports events given its 
size and demographics? Do commercial sports enable a rebuilding of New Or-
leans’s storm-ravaged infrastructure or does it force civic trade-offs made even 
more painful by the storm?
Independent scholarship in general has not supported the thesis that pro-
fessional sports induce significant increases in economic activity for host cit-
ies. New Orleans, however, may be different. The city is smaller and less afflu-
ent than other host cities in general, and it may be that the frequency with 
which large sports events are hosted by New Orleans makes the area an excep-
tion to the experience of most cities with regard to sports and economic devel-
opment. The gravity of the city’s economic situation in the wake of Katrina ne-
cessitates an individual and more complete appraisal as strategies for econom-
ic redevelopment are explored. Answers to the questions raised in this intro-
duction require a review of, among other things, New Orleans’ place in the na-
tional  professional  sports  landscape,  the  extent  of  the  damage  Katrina 
wrought, the amount of redevelopment money the city must commit, and the 
evidence with regard to the impact sports has on host city economies with 
special attention to the circumstances that surround New Orleans in its rebuild-
ing period.
New Orleans Prior to Katrina
While New Orleans hosts major league franchises in both the NFL and NBA, 
with a pre-Hurricane metropolitan area population of less than 1.5 million resi-
dents, the city was already a small market for any of the major sports leagues 
in the U.S. As shown in Table 1, New Orleans is the 41st largest metropolitan 
area in the United States by population, and is the 36th largest city out of the 40 
hosting a team from one of the five large professional sports leagues in coun-
try. Furthermore, five cities in the country without any major sports franchises, 
Las Vegas, Virginia Beach/Norfolk, Providence, Greensboro, and Austin, are all 
larger than New Orleans. Another nine larger cities are without an NBA team, 
including several with strong ambitions to attract a franchise such as Kansas 
City and St. Louis. 14 cities without an NFL franchise have larger population ba-
ses than New Orleans, including Los Angeles, the nation’s second largest mar-
ket, and football hungry San Antonio, which played host to the New Orleans 
Saints for three of their “home” games during the 2005 season. Not only is New 
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Orleans small, but it is also relatively poor, ranking 45th in per capita personal 
income among the cities listed in Table 1 and 36th out of the 40 cities with ma-
jor professional sports franchises.




US-Dollar) Rank NFL NBA NHL MLB MLS Total
New York City, 
NY 21,899,042 1 43,428 4 2 2 3 2 1 9
Los Angeles, 
CA 17,481,473 2 33,264 30 0 2 2 2 2 8
Chicago, IL 9,610,038 3 36,935 12 1 1 1 2 1 6
San Francisco-
Bay Area, CA 7,148,000 4 46,926 2 2 1 1 2 0 6
Philadelphia, PA 5,949,976 5 38,475 10 1 1 1 1 0 4
Dallas-Fort 
Worth, TX 5,927,494 6 35,105 17 1 1 1 1 1 5
Boston, MA 5,802,063 7 43,664 3 1 1 1 1 1 5
Detroit, MI 5,424,253 8 35,955 15 1 1 1 1 0 4
Washington, DC 5,405,816 9 65,027 1 1 1 1 1 1 5
Miami-South 
Florida, FL 5,355,903 10 34,278 21 1 1 1 1 0 4
Houston, TX 5,277,455 11 36,529 13 1 1 0 1 1 4
Atlanta, GA 5,121,741 12 33,251 31 1 1 1 1 0 4
Seattle, WA 3,766,678 13 40,081 6 1 1 0 1 0 3
Phoenix, AZ 3,713,291 14 31,133 44 1 1 1 1 0 4
Minneapolis- 
St. Paul, MN 3,434,066 15 39,796 8 1 1 1 1 0 4
Cleveland, OH 2,938,607 16 33,522 28 1 1 0 1 0 3
San Diego, CA 2,935,190 17 37,965 11 1 0 0 1 0 2
St. Louis, MO 2,829,371 18 34,461 19 1 0 1 1 0 3
Baltimore, MD 2,644,744 19 38,813 9 1 0 0 1 0 2




US-Dollar) Rank NFL NBA NHL MLB MLS Total
Denver, CO 2,605,861 20 41,229 5 1 1 1 1 1 5
Tampa Bay, FL 2,586,417 21 31,677 43 1 0 1 1 0 3
Pittsburgh, PA 2,490,915 22 34,345 20 1 0 1 1 0 3
Sacramento, CA 2,157,974 23 33,567 27 0 1 0 0 0 1
Cincinnati, OH 2,099,045 24 34,221 22 1 0 0 1 0 2
Charlotte, NC 2,067,297 25 32,217 40 1 1 0 0 0 2
Portland, OR 2,062,109 26 33,875 26 0 1 0 0 0 1
Kansas City 1,994,720 27 34,207 23 1 0 0 1 1 3
Indianapolis, IN 1,934,621 28 34,186 24 1 1 0 0 0 2
Orlando, FL 1,923,655 29 29,256 51 0 1 0 0 0 1
Columbus, OH 1,917,450 30 33,109 32 0 0 1 0 1 2
San Antonio, TX 1,852,508 31 28,946 52 0 1 0 0 0 1
Milwaukee, WI 1,707,181 32 36,062 14 0 1 0 1 0 2
Las Vegas, NV 1,686,210 33 32,831 33 0 0 0 0 0 0
Virginia Beach- 
Norfolk, VA 1,641,671 34 31,811 42 0 0 0 0 0 0
Providence, RI 1,627,194 35 33,912 25 0 0 0 0 0 0
Salt Lake City, UT 1,559,957 36 29,775 48 0 1 0 0 1 2
Greensboro-Win-
ston-Salem, NC 1,472,050 37 29,658 49 0 0 0 0 0 0
Nashville, TN 1,469,698 38 34,559 18 1 0 1 0 0 2
Raleigh-
Durham, NC 1,466,593 39 33,292 29 0 0 1 0 0 1
Austin, TX 1,411,199 40 32,494 37 0 0 0 0 0 0
New Orleans, 
LA 1,362,086 41 30,693 45 1 1 0 0 0 2
Louisville, KY 1 332 300 42 32 543 35 0 0 0 0 0 0
Grand Rapids, 
MI 1 305 498 43 29 546 50 0 0 0 0 0 0
Hartford, CT 1 297 440 44 39 918 7 0 0 0 0 0 0




US-Dollar) Rank NFL NBA NHL MLB MLS Total
Memphis, TN 1 248 492 45 32 741 34 0 1 0 0 0 1
Buffalo, NY 1,236,788 46 30,627 46 1 0 1 0 0 2
Jacksonville, FL 1,223,741 47 32,283 39 1 0 0 0 0 1
Oklahoma City, OK 1,210,109 48 30,033 47 0 0 0 0 0 0
Greenville, SC 1,172,838 49 27,207 53 0 0 0 0 0 0
Birmingham, AL 1,160,814 50 32,538 36 0 0 0 0 0 0
Richmond, VA 1,156,849 51 35,422 16 0 0 0 0 0 0
Albany, NY 1,140,770 52 32,298 38 0 0 0 0 0 0
Green Bay, WI 295,049 n. a. 31,925 41 1 0 0 0 0 1
Another  strike  against  New Orleans  is  its  business  climate, as  corporations 
play a major role in keeping a team financially competitive. It is one thing to 
provide highly profitable luxury seating; it is another to fill those seats. The 
city is home to just two Fortune 500 companies: Entergy, ranked 218th and Free-
port McMoRan Copper and Gold, ranked 480th, and there is, therefore, not the 
market for loges and club seats that can be found in the other NBA and NFL cit-
ies  with  which  New Orleans  competes.2 One  writer  somewhat  whimsically 
stated the NFL financial equation in the following way:
“Instead of fans, the NFL seeks corporations ... While the NBA and Major 
League  Baseball  have  guaranteed  contracts  for  their  players,  the  NFL 
with its exorbitant TV rights deals and corporate backing has practically 
given their owners guaranteed dollars …”
“The way business is done now is the owner convinces his buddies who 
own the largest businesses in their respective cities to buy majority (sic) 
of the season tickets and luxury boxes. The result: a term exclusive to 
the NFL, the guaranteed sellout. Saints owner Tom Benson can’t do that 
in New Orleans because there are no major corporations other than En-
tergy to back him.”3
2 Corbett (2006).
3 Terrebonne Parrish Courier (2005).
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The competition to host a professional sports team is often as fierce as the 
competition among athletes on game day, and the lack of population base and 
both personal and corporate wealth places New Orleans at a considerable dis-
advantage in supporting and, therefore, retaining either the Saints or the Hor-
nets. Prior to Hurricane Katrina, in fact, New Orleans appeared to be on the 
verge of losing their NFL franchise. Tom Benson, the owner of the Saints, had 
reportedly rejected the state’s final offer to keep the Saints in New Orleans in 
late April of 2005. The state’s offer included not only public financing of over 
75 % of a proposed 174 million US-Dollars Superdome renovation, but also dire-
ct cash payments to the Saints totaling 64 million US-Dollars through 2008 
and 9.5 million US-Dollars per year after the completion of the renovations to 
the Superdome in 2008.4 The state’s offer to the Saints, including the annual 
cash subsidy, would have placed the team in the top half of the financial stand-
ings in the NFL.
The fact that Benson would reject such an offer, which included a direct 
cash subsidy to the team, speaks volumes about the financial realities of the 
NFL and the inordinate transfer of business risk from teams to their host cities. 
While the state struggled to meet its contractual cash payments to the team in 
the wake of reduced tax revenues following the terrorist attacks of September 
11, 2001, the only significant financial risk facing Tom Benson was the 81 million 
US-Dollars  he would have been required to  pay (representing the subsidies 
that the Saints have received since 2001), if he had broken his Superdome con-
tract, which he could have done following the 2006 season.5 That risk pales in 
comparison to the 1 billion US-Dollars written offer Benson claims to have re-
ceived for the team in 2005, a 1,400 % increase over the 70 million US-Dollars 
price Benson paid for the Saints in 1985.6 The lucrative offer Benson received 
for the team reflects at least in part the money-making potential of NFL teams, 
which is explained in large part by the subsidies cities extend to attract a sup-
ply of teams that is limited by the NFL and its owners.
While recognizing New Orleans shortcomings as it relates to its ability 
to host professional sports, on the other side of the coin, the city caters to 
the tourist trade to an extent that distinguishes itself from almost every oth-
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provides a  comparative advantage in  hosting events  to  include commercial 
sports over most cities in the United States. The city’s performance in attract-
ing outside events supports the idea that it has exercised its comparative ad-
vantage. Even though New Orleans is a relatively small city, it ranked fifth in 
the United States in the number of conventions hosted.7 Prior to the storm, 
New Orleans annually attracted more than ten million visitors who spent in 
excess of five billion US-Dollars per year according to the New Orleans Metro-
politan and Tourism Bureau.
The information recorded in Table 2 in a general sense indicates the ex-
tent to which New Orleans is geared to tourism. The fraction of the New Or-
leans economy that was accounted for by “Accommodation and Food Service” 
(NAICS 72) in 2004 indicated that New Orleans had a significantly larger tour-
ist component than did the United States overall and three other southern cities 
in the U.S. that hosted NBA and NFL teams. It is noteworthy that the New Or-
leans tourist sector as measured by employees and payroll in NAICS 72 is more 
than 25 % larger than that of Miami, Florida, which among the comparison 
group is generally regarded as the most tourist based.
Table 2: Aggregate Measures of the Fraction of the Economic Activity for Selected Cities and the United 




Employees as a % of 
Total Area Employees 
NAICS 72
Annual Payroll as 
a % of Total Area 
Payroll
NAICS 72
Establishments as a % 
of Total Area Establish-
ments
United States 9.34 3.46 1.61
New Orleans 13.46 5.83 9.47
Atlanta 9.22 3.15 7.38
Houston 9.05 2.83 7.35
Miami 10.56 4.52 5.95
Commercial sport, of course, is one important aspect of the tourist/leisure in-
dustry, and it could play a role in the economic revitalization of New Orleans. 
Since opening in 1975, the Superdome has hosted numerous sporting events of 
7 Tennessean News Services (2005).
8 Source: http://censtats.census.gov/cgi-bin/msanaic/msasect.pl.
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national significance including the NFL’s Super Bowl in 1978, 1981, 1986, 1990, 
1997, and 2002, the National Intercollegiate Athletic Association Men’s Basket-
ball Final Four in 1982, 1987, 1993, and 2003. Furthermore, the Superdome annu-
ally hosts the Sugar Bowl, one of college football’s top post-season matches and 
a game which has determined college football’s national champion nine times 
since 1975.
Replacing  the  infrastructure  for  professional  sports  and  mega-sports 
events can be justified if the benefits provided by the facilities exceed the costs 
incurred in the reconstruction. Both costs and benefits have to be measured 
over time since the facilities provided a stream of benefits as well as generat-
ing costs associated with operations and maintenance (O&M). Comprehensive 
economic analysis would include not only the explicit benefits but also the im-
plicit benefits and costs, which are difficult not only to measure but in many 
cases to identify.
Data do exist for New Orleans for the number of establishments, annual 
payroll, and number of employees for a variety of entertainment related indus-
tries defined according to the North American Industrial Classification System 
(NAICS) and these data are recorded in Table 2.
All  data  point  to  the  fact  that  the  economic  activity  accounted  for 
through the “Arts, Entertainment, and Recreation” industry (NAICS 71) for New 
Orleans  is  absolutely  small, but  large  when  compared to  the  United  States 
overall.  Census  data,  thus,  supports  the  idea  that  New  Orleans  is  a  tour-
ist-based  economy  that  exhibits  an  arts-entertainment-recreation  industry 
that is larger than that characterizing the United States as a whole. 
The contribution of “Spectator Sports” (NAICS 7112), however, is less than 1 
% by any of the measures identified in Table 3. Despite the high salaries paid 
professional athletes, the spectator sports industry typically accounts for less 
than 1 % of a city’s payroll, and, by that measure, the industry is not economic-
ally vital to cities in the United States in general to include New Orleans.
Numerous studies of both professional sports franchises and stadiums as 
well  as of mega-events, furthermore, lend support to the notion that sports 
have little impact on local economies. Analyses of the Super Bowl,9 NCAA Final 
Four,10 and mega-events in general,11 for example, have all concluded that these 
big sporting events have no statistically significant impact on any number of 
9 Baade/Matheson (2006) and Porter (1999).
10 Baade/Matheson (2004).
11 Coates/Humphreys (2002) and Baade et al. (2008).
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economic  variables  such  as  employment,  per  capita  income,  metropolitan 
area-wide gross domestic product, or taxable sales. Most recently, Coates and 
Depken  indicated  ambivalence  about  the  economic  contribution  of  sports 
mega-events.12 Coates  and Depken concluded: “The upshot is, therefore, that 
these mega-events are not necessarily the economic windfall that their pro-
ponents portray them to be.” Stadiums and professional franchises similarly 
show little in the way of economic benefits for host cities.13
Given the economically tenuous state of professional sports in New Or-
leans prior to Hurricane Katrina, it is difficult to imagine that a disaster of its 
magnitude would improve to prospects for the industry in the city. The next 
section of the paper summarizes the extent of the damage with a particular 
emphasis on the demographic changes that may be sufficiently long-lived to 
adversely influence the prospects for supporting professional sports in New 
Orleans in the long term.
Table 3: Aggregate  Measures  of  the  Fraction  of  New  Orleans  Economic  Activity  in  Total  
Represented by Spectator Sports for 199714















1.16 % 0.62 %









0.94 % 0.20 %
12 Coates/Depken (2006).
13 Baade/Dye (1990), Coates/Humphreys (1999), and Baade et al. (2008).
14 Specific data for New Orleans for two-digit NAICS 71 data and above for 1998 and beyond from the County Business Pat-
terns website is not available. Archived data for NAICS and SIC data were used to calculate the percentages in the table.  
These  percentages  correspond  to  the  higher  end  of  the  ranges  identified  in  http://censtats.census.gov/cgi-bin/ 
msanaic/msasect.pl. If an average of the value ranges identified were used, it would reduce the percentages and 
strengthen the arguments offered in the paper’s text.
15 Comparable Statistics for the United States are from the most recent County Business Patterns data for 2004. 
Source: http://censtats.census.gov/cgi-bin/msanaic/msasect.pl
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Measuring Katrina’s Devastation 
Hurricane Katrina, which swept into New Orleans and the Gulf Coast on Au-
gust 29, 2005, caused far and away the largest damages in real dollar terms of 
any hurricane in U.S. history, with uninsured losses topping 100 billion US-Dol-
lars16 and insured losses estimated at 34.4 billion US-Dollars17. Its final death toll 
of over 1,400 also places it among the worst natural disasters ever suffered by 
the United States. New Orleans was particularly hard hit by the storm, as flood 
waters remained for weeks after Katrina while levies were repaired, and re-
building the city is an epic undertaking unmatched in scope and expense in re-
cent U.S. history.
The cost of reconstructing New Orleans itself has been placed at more 
than 100 billion US-Dollars.18 Approximately 80 % of New Orleans’ 188,000 oc-
cupied housing units were severely damaged by the storm. Furthermore, more 
than half of the city’s 100,000 owner-occupied homes were built before 1950, 
and their repair and replacement will require expensive modifications to meet 
modern building codes designed to prevent future hurricane damage.19
The damage to middle class neighborhoods has substantial implications 
for the redevelopment effort both as it relates to production and consumption. 
Without a middle class, New Orleans will not have the workers it needs to run 
the economy that existed prior to Katrina, and the spending necessary to re-
store the economy to pre-hurricane levels will be deficient. Katrina devastated 
the housing stock, schools, and other infrastructure vital to normal life for all 
socio-economic classes.
The extent of the damage to the social infrastructure must also be care-
fully assessed since the return of middle class workers and consumers is essen-
tial to the revitalization of the New Orleans economy. Even before Katrina, by 
nearly every measure of economic development, New Orleans lagged behind 
other large American cities. Labor force participation rates and employment to 
population ratios in New Orleans averaged 5 % to 10 % below national levels 
for most demographic groups.20 Hurricane damaged areas in Louisiana had pov-
erty rates above the national average (21.4 % vs. 12.4 %), and New Orleans resid-
16 Bloomberg News (2005).
17 Powell (2005).
18 Tennessean News Service (2005).
19 Ibid.
20 Gabe et al. (2005).
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ents were less likely (55 % vs. 66 %) to live in owner-occupied housing than res-
idents  of  other  large cities.21 Finally, the educational  attainment of  younger 
adults (age 18 to 34) for storm-damaged areas is generally below that for the 
rest of the nation. For example, 22.9 % of young adults in hurricane damaged 
areas had not completed a high school degree compared with 20.6 % nation-
wide, while only 22.5 % had completed a college degree compared with 29.3 % 
nationwide.22
These figures have several implications for the likelihood that people dis-
placed will return. First, Katrina hit the economically disadvantaged hardest. 
Statistics indicate that other places in the nation to which they have relocated 
will improve their opportunities for employment. Second, significant portions 
of the middle class were displaced in the storm-ravaged area; 47.4 % of those 
displaced had education equivalent to some college or above.23 Third, 45 % of 
those displaced did not live in homes that they owned indicating that a signific-
ant portion of the people displaced by Hurricane Katrina have weak financial 
ties to the communities they abandoned. A significant permanent displacement 
of the population affected by the storm will undermine or may substantially al-
ter the socio-demographic character of neighborhoods mostly adversely affected 
by the storm. It should also be noted that virtually entire neighborhoods and 
parishes were wiped out by the storm, and devastation of that magnitude may 
well negate any pull that community loyalty and ties may exert in bringing 
people  back.  It  has  been  estimated,  for  example,  that  Orleans  Parish  and 
St. Bernard Parish lost 65.9 and 89.8 % of their populations over the period Octo-
ber 2005 to January 2006.24 Even if people were inclined to return, the infrastruc-
ture necessary to rebuild and sustain people has been eliminated. Government 
programs, furthermore, have been unable to compensate for lost private infra-
structure to this point.
It is also important to note that the Superdome itself, which served an ill-
fated role as a center for 30,000 refugees who were unable to escape the city 
prior  to  the  storm, suffered  extensive  damage  due  to  Katrina  as  did  other 
sports facilities throughout the city.
21 Gabe et al. (2005).
22 Ibid.
23 Ibid.
24 Greater New Orleans Community Data Center (2005).
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The Economy of New Orleans Post-Katrina and the Sports Industry
The New Orleans economy served the nation as a tourist center and transpor-
tation hub for water transport in particular as previously noted, and therefore, 
any economic redevelopment effort should focus on those industries, an opini-
on endorsed by members of an ad hoc committee of urban experts assembled 
under the auspices of the Urban Land Institute. The information in Table 4, to 
be specific, indicates that in July 2005, 32.9 % of the labor force in New Orleans 
was employed in the “Trade and Transportation” and “Leisure and Hospitality” 
sectors. The numbers recorded in Table 4 indicate several things worthy of note 
as it relates to characterizing the New Orleans economy pre- and post-Katrina. 
First, the transportation/trade and leisure/hospitality industries, the cornersto-
nes of the New Orleans economy, are recovering, albeit slowly. The numbers 
employed in trade and leisure as of December 2006 remain down by 25.2 and 
31.8 %, respectively, but are up from the July 2006 employment figures by mo-
dest amounts.
Second, the unemployment rate in New Orleans as of December 2006 is 
below that for the United States. Prior to Katrina, the unemployment rate in 
New Orleans was above the rate for the country. The smaller labor force in 
New Orleans following Katrina, of course, obscures developments with respect 
to the unemployment rate, but the workers who remained in or returned to 
New Orleans are able to find work.
Third, all relevant statistics in Table 4 point to a contraction of the leisure 
industry following Hurricane Katrina. There continues to be fewer people fly-
ing into New Orleans in comparison to pre-Katrina levels, and a smaller num-
ber of establishments to accommodate them. Nearly one year after Katrina, the 
number of retail food establishments was 44 % of the level prior to the storm, 
and the number of hotels open remains below the pre-Katrina level.
Fourth, the government sector has expanded relative to the private sector, 
and the federal government’s presence, while absolutely and relatively small, is 
approximately one-third larger as measured in terms of the percentage-of-labor-
force employed by the federal government in December 2006 than it was pre-
Katrina.
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Table 4: Comparing the Pre- and Post-Katrina Economies for the New Orleans MSA25
Statistic/Date July 2005 July 2006 December 2006
MSA Population 1,292,774 914,74526
Unemployment Rate [Louisiana = 5.6 %] 
New Orleans = 5.3 % 
(United States = 4.9 %)
[Louisiana = 2.9 %] 
New Orleans = 4.2 % 
(United States = 4.8 %)
[Louisiana = 4.3 %] 
New Orleans = 4.4 % 
(United States  =4.5 %)
Labor Force Size 637,952 440,521 (Down 30.9 % 
from July 2005)
432,494 (Down 32.2 % 
from July 2005)
Population Employed  
in the Transportation  
and Trade Sector
123,200 89,700 (Down 27.2 % 
from July 2005)
92,100 (Down 25.2 % 
from July 2005)
Population Employed 
in the Hospitality  
and Leisure Sector
86,500 58,500 (Down 32.4 % 
from July 2005)
59,000 (Down 31.8 % 
from July 2005)
Public Transportation: 
% of the System 
Operational
100 % 17 % 17 %
Number of Workers  
Employed by 
Government 
103,000 or 16.3 % of 
the labor force for 
government at all 
levels; 15,600 for the 
federal government 
or 2.0 %
90,500 or 20.7 % of 
the labor force for 
government at all 
levels; 13,700 for the 
federal government 
or 3.1 %
91,300 or 20.4 % of 
the labor force for 
government at all 
levels; 12,100 for the 
federal government 
or 2.7 %
Number of Open 
Hotels
142 116 (Down 18 % 
from July 2005)
127 (Down 11 % from 
Jul 2005)
Open Retail Food 
Establishments
100 % 44 % Not Available
Number of Passengers  
Arriving at the New  
Orleans Airport
441,356 281,015 (Down 36 % 
from July 2005)
286,018 (Down 35 % 
from July 2005)
25 Source: Greater New Orleans Community Data Center, The Katrina Index, February 15, 2007, www.gnocdc.org; ac-
cessed on March 3, 2007.
26 Statistic from January 2006. Note the metropolitan population for New Orleans fell by 29.2 % from July 2005 to 
January 2006.
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It cannot be predicted at this juncture if and when New Orleans will return to 
those population and economic-activity levels that existed prior to the storm. 
There is compelling scholarship by Davis and Weinstein to suggest that popu-
lation and economic activity across cities and regions within a country are not 
random occurrences, but rather reflect “locational fundamentals,” e.g., location 
on a coast or significant river (physical geography), and economies of scale em-
anating from “economic clustering”.27 The Davis and Weinstein study is based 
on 8,000 years of data on Japanese regions, and Japan’s population is far more 
homogenous  than  that  characterizing  the  United  States. The  population  of 
New Orleans is particularly diverse. 
Other scholarship supports the importance of locational fundamentals in 
explaining developments  relating to  population movements  following cata-
strophic events. Evidence following the Chicago Fire of 1871, indicates that the 
City’s recovery from that event depended on location fundamentals specific to 
neighborhoods.28 More recently, economic recovery from the 1992 Rodney King 
riots in Los Angeles was notably slow as compared to Miami’s experience fol-
lowing the devastation of Hurricane Andrew in the same year.29 Taken togeth-
er, these findings suggest that heterogeneity as it relates in part to ethnicity, 
shared values and culture, income and wealth, and education can retard re-
development and efforts to resettle. Many New Orleans neighborhoods where 
redevelopment has been slow to occur exhibit marked variation in these char-
acteristics  and  relatively  low  rates  of  home  ownership  as  previously  men-
tioned.
The extent of the devastation caused by Katrina coupled with the demo-
graphic character of New Orleans prior to the storm bears on the prospects 
that residents of the city will resettle. The likelihood that New Orleans will re-
turn to its pre-Katrina state, in turn, will affect the probability that profession-
al sports teams will remain in the city. If the chances increase that pro-sport 
teams will eventually leave due to a lack of fan support that has implications 
for the efficacy of substantial public investments to replace or repair the pro-
fessional sports infrastructure.
Paradoxically, the extent of the devastation and the significant pressure 
exerted on the public sector to demonstrate its resolve and ability to help the 
city recover enhances the prospects that those edifices most representative of 
27 Davis/Weinstein (2002).
28 Macaulay (2005).
29 Baade/Matheson (2004), and Baade et al. (2007).
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the city to the outside world will be restored. Delaney and Eckstein identified 
the  strength  of  “local  growth  coalitions”  as  vital  to  understanding  public 
choices regarding the construction of sports infrastructure.30 The public choice 
theory detailed by Delaney and Eckstein helps explain decision making in New 
Orleans with regard to the rapid reconstruction of the Superdome, and the suc-
cessful floating of the 294 million US-Dollars bond issue that financed the re-
pair. Not only was there a strong local growth coalition following Katrina, but 
that local effort was bolstered by a strong national sentiment for helping New 
Orleans get back on its feet. Ironically, the ineptitude that government displayed 
arguably at all levels immediately following the storm increased the pressure 
on  government  to  correct  the  negative  perceptions  about  its  performance. 
Louisiana Governor Kathleen Babineaux Blanco in announcing the bond sale 
remarked that, “Rebuilding and reopening the Superdome were critical steps in 
Louisiana’s recovery from hurricanes Katrina and Rita and this bond sale made 
them possible”.31 The Superdome as a symbol of the city’s ability to survive and 
its  struggle  to  recover  achieved  particular  significance  as  Katrina’s  impact 
played out.
The demand for the Saints, the primary tenant of the Superdome, has 
been given a boost by the increase in the political demand for the Superdome. 
The political resistance for public subsidies to keep the Saints from marching 
elsewhere has eased, and the successful sale of the bonds to repair and renov-
ate the Superdome corroborates that assertion. The NFL, furthermore, has to 
temper Tom Benson’s desire to move the franchise to keep the League’s image 
from being tarnished further by widely criticized franchise moves from Los 
Angeles to St. Louis and Oakland and from Cleveland to Baltimore. The “good-
cop” role played by the NFL in keeping the Saints in New Orleans may well fa-
cilitate financial transfers to Tom Benson from a grateful city. All in all, in a pe-
culiar way, financial transfers to Tom Benson have been made easier as a con-
sequence of the storm.
Once again the efficacy of those transfers depends on the prospects for 
redevelopment in New Orleans and that depends on the city’s ability to restore 
its place as a leading transportation and leisure center. Much of the tourism in-
dustry in New Orleans is “high-ground” based in the French Quarter, the Centr-
30 Delaney/Eckstein (2003).
31 New Orleans City Business (2006).
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al Business District (CBD), and the Garden District. The Urban Land Institute 
committee, which met on November 18, 2005 opined:
“New Orleans should concentrate its rebuilding efforts on the sections of 
the city that occupy the high ground, while securing lower-lying areas 
for  potential  long-term rebirth … it’s  not  practical  to  redevelop  every 
acre of New Orleans in the short term, considering that 300,000 resid-
ents and 160,000 jobs have been lost. It’s also not socially equitable to 
allow  residents  back  into  neighborhoods  that  do  not  have  adequate 
levee protection and may be toxic …”.32
The report of the Bring Back New Orleans Commission recommended that all 
of New Orleans not necessarily be rebuilt. If that recommendation is followed, 
the post-Katrina New Orleans will be smaller than the it was before the storm, 
and that has implications for the ability (or willingness) of sports to serve as a 
catalyst for economic redevelopment. Even if the metropolitan area shrinks by 
as few as 250,000 residents, still suggesting that over 80 % of the population 
would return to  the  area, New Orleans would become the  second smallest 
“major-league” city  in  the  country  behind  only  Green  Bay, Wisconsin, and 
would be smaller  than such distinctly “non-major league” cities such as Al-
bany, Richmond, Birmingham, and Grand Rapids, Michigan.
Tourists will not likely return to a city that cannot provide essential ser-
vices, and in the absence of tourists, the New Orleans economy will struggle at 
least for a time. One part of the blueprint for restoration of the New Orleans 
economy  will  require  restoration  of  housing  and  essential  services  for  its 
middle class who provide the labor and entrepreneurial talent for the tourism 
industry, followed by a revitalization of those businesses that cater to tourists. 
The extent to  which professional  sports  and mega-events contribute to  the 
tourist trade must be assessed in determining the fraction of scarce capital re-
sources that should be devoted to the restoration of the infrastructure neces-
sary to accommodate professional sports and mega-sports events. 
Following Katrina, plans for  completely replacing the Superdome were 
scuttled, but as previously mentioned bonds were sold to renovate the Super-
dome. These funds were used to not only repair the Superdome but more than 
50 million US-Dollars was spent to update the facility with new audio and 
visual  equipment,  more  luxury  seating,  concession  stands  and  wider  con-
32 Carr (2005).
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courses so that it would be competitive with the newer structures that exist in 
the NFL. While the NFL as a league pledged 20 million US-Dollars towards these 
repairs, Saints owner Tom Benson, the primary tenant of the facility, paid noth-
ing towards its reconstruction. Louisiana had only a 500 million US-Dollars in-
surance policy on state buildings along with 100 million US-Dollars in flood in-
surance, and the Superdome was just one of the many public buildings including 
schools damaged by the storm, so some have questioned the priority placed on 
this facility.33
Given the very small percentage of economic activity in New Orleans 
accounted for by the sports industry, it may not be prudent to devote a dispro-
portionate  share  of  scarce  redevelopment  funds  to  that  sector.  An  even 
stronger argument can be made against refurbishing the Superdome to accom-
modate the financial needs of the NFL Saints since their owner has consiste-
ntly  sought economic concessions from a city and state that were financially 
stressed even prior to Katrina.
The economic incentive for the Saints owner to keep the team in New Or-
leans has been compromised by Katrina if the New Orleans economy cannot 
recover. Lacking the financial wherewithal to support professional sports fol-
lowing Katrina, it is not reasonable to expect that the team will make the fin-
ancial sacrifices that are necessary as New Orleans attempts to rebuild. Fur-
thermore, unlike the efforts made by large oil companies and small business 
alike to repair the capital intensive oil refineries as well as small restaurants 
and shops in and around the city, there exists little motivation for the Saints to 
recoup their small investment in infrastructure. This points to a larger problem 
with the financial structure of the professional sports industry throughout the 
United States: the existence of substantial subsidies for infrastructure under-
mines the team commitment to their host cities, and absent any meaningful 
risk to their own capital, what incentive do teams have to stay in a city that ex-
periences a catastrophe on the scale of Hurricane Katrina if a portion of the 
team’s investment in infrastructure is recoverable? There is little question that 
in the vast majority of cases, the financial risk accompanying hosting profes-
sional sports in the United States is disproportionately borne by the host com-
munity. Katrina provides striking testimony to the reality of how subsidies for 
sports infrastructure have contributed to that financial vulnerability.
33 Corbett (2006).
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While much of New Orleans’ Lower 9th Ward remains a tangle of rubble 
and destroyed houses more than one year after Katrina, the Superdome re-
opened for the 2006 NFL season. The restoration of the Superdome and the re-
turn of the Saints has symbolic significance, but it does not necessarily serve to 
indicate that New Orleans is on the road to recovery. Those residents who have 
returned to the city have embraced the team by purchasing a record number of 
season tickets for the 2006 season. The fans’ response, however, failed to im-
press the Saints owner who noted that, “You haven’t seen the total commit-
ment yet. No National Football  League team can live on tickets alone … The 
next big step is that the business community needs to step up.”34 Limited by 
the small number of large corporations in the city and the redevelopment pri-
orities faced by the city’s small  businesses, 40 % of the Superdome’s luxury 
suites remained unsold as of May 2006. As luxury suites are not part of the 
league’s revenue sharing deal, they provide significant profits to a team’s own-
er. The fact that Tom Benson was unsatisfied with the millions spent on stadi-
um repairs and improvements entirely paid for by others and with record sea-
son ticket purchases by local residents bodes ill for the Saints’ long-term future 
in New Orleans. The fact that the Saints played for the National Football Con-
ference title in January of 2007 should create excitement about the team for 
the near future, but the team will have to sustain success to maintain the ex-
traordinary level  of  fan interest  necessary in very small  markets. Relatively 
high revenues are the key to keeping teams, and as Tom Benson noted that re-
quires more than ticket sales.
While the Hornets’ future has received somewhat less press, in part be-
cause the team is relatively new to the city, that team’s long-term future in the 
city  appears  equally  shaky.  The  team  has  been  officially  renamed  the  Ok-
lahoma City/New Orleans  Hornets, and  they  will  play only  six  of  41  home 
games in New Orleans during the 2006/07 season.
Consumer spending on major league professional sports by local resid-
ents probably also serves to slow down the recovery of the local economy. The 
money spent on attending a sports event by residents of the home-team com-
munity necessarily precludes them from spending that money on other locally 
owned and operated entertainment. Furthermore, local expenditures on pro-
fessional sports may actually reduce total spending in the economy as opposed 
to  simply  reallocating  money  among  competing  ends.  Professional  sports, 
34 Ibid.
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which use national resource markets as opposed to locally owned and oper-
ated  resources  for  alternative  entertainment  or  recreational  activities, may 
foster a net outflow of money. Most of the money spent on a night at a profes-
sional sports event goes to the athletes and owners of the team who may not 
live in the community in which they play. Siegfried and Zimbalist note that 
while 93 % of average employees live in the area where they work, only 29 % of 
NBA players do the same (and the figures are likely to be similar in the NFL and 
other major leagues).35 Given the generally poor condition of the city following 
Katrina, it is even less likely that millionaire athletes, and those with the finan-
cial wherewithal to live elsewhere, will choose to reside in the Big Easy, and 
certainly owner Tom Benson, who has business interests in San Antonio, has 
shown little interest in spending money in the city.
Furthermore, the devastation of the middle and lower classes in New Or-
leans has eliminated not just the customers, but also the labor upon which 
professional sports relies. Each large event at the Superdome requires approx-
imately 2,500 part-time workers. Unfortunately, the lack of housing in New Or-
leans means that no such pool of potential part-time workers is readily avail-
able in the city. Indeed, a good fraction of the workers at the facility will very 
likely have to come from outside the city. The leakage of money from New Or-
leans through athletes repatriating their incomes to their primary residences 
would further be enhanced by ordinary workers doing the same thing in some 
appreciable amount because of a lack of housing in many New Orleans neigh-
borhoods. Post-Katrina, it  is  even less likely  that income generated through 
commercial sports activities would remain in the city.
This is not to say that there are not any investments in sports infrastruc-
ture that can promote redevelopment. Tulane University, for example, engaged 
in a significant reconstruction program for its athletic complexes as part of its 
250 million US-Dollars  campus-wide rehabilitation effort  following the hur-
ricane.36 Tulane, unlike the Saints, has a huge financial commitment in its cam-
pus, and it is motivated to recoup its past investment. Division 1 intercollegiate 
sports serve as a recruitment tool for both athletes and prospective students as 
the school attempts to rebuild its student body.
35 Siegfried/Zimbalist (2002).
36 Henderson (2006).
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Conclusions and Policy Implications
Hurricane Katrina induced a massive outflow of residents and businesses from 
the city of New Orleans. The city’s two major professional sports teams, the 
NFL Saints and NBA Hornets are included among the businesses that had to 
leave due to the extensive damage to their infrastructure. The capital costs and 
other financial commitments necessary to encourage the return of the Saints 
and the Hornets for the long term are substantial. The images of the NFL and 
NBA will be damaged if the Saints and Hornets do not at least make cameo ap-
pearances, but in the longer term, the teams and their leagues will demand 
greater revenue streams than can be generated in their current facilities even 
if New Orleans recovers to pre-Katrina levels. The fact that New Orleans and 
the State of Louisiana were directly subsidizing the teams indicates that pre-
Katrina the teams were not generating revenues in their venues that allowed 
them to be financially competitive in their leagues. This paper has concluded 
that it may be financially ill-advised in the post-Katrina world to direct sub-
stantial funds at refurbishing and upgrading the Superdome and New Orleans 
arena or to continue to directly subsidize the franchises specifically to make 
the teams financially competitive.
Capital expenditures on the Superdome supplant capital expenditures on 
housing, schooling, and other middle class amenities that will bring the middle 
class back, and the reconstruction of the Superdome in the short run should 
have been undertaken only after spending on housing and other infrastructure 
repairs. Furthermore, restoration efforts for the Superdome and New Orleans 
Arena should not necessarily be directed towards amenities that provide the 
highest revenues for sports franchises, but instead providing a multipurpose 
facility for  the  general  tourist  trade. Providing physical  accommodation for 
professional sports teams does not advance the economic interests of New Or-
leans in the short term. Doing so would exacerbate the economic problems 
that currently exist.
One odd consequence of Katrina is that it may well have made it virtually 
impossible for the Saints to leave New Orleans in the short term, while at the 
same time  requiring  substantial  public  investment to  provide  accommoda-
tions for the team for what may be a short-lived stay. The opportunity costs for 
the funds necessary to rebuild the sports infrastructure have never been high-
er, but the political demand for a demonstrable recovery from Katrina and Rita 
to include the highly symbolic reconstruction of sports facilities has sharply 
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shifted the demand for their restoration to the right. The fact that a year after 
the storm, a bond issue for 294 million US-Dollars to refurbish the Superdome 
was sold with relatively little resistance provides striking testimony to this as-
sertion. Tom Benson and the Saints have benefited from financial  transfers 
from the City of New Orleans and the NFL. These transfers very likely would 
have been strongly contested and may not have occurred at all in the absence 
of the storm.
Cities in general should be mindful of the fact that subsidies for profes-
sional sports teams eliminate the financial incentives teams would have to re-
main in the community following a natural or man-made disaster. Businesses 
that  have risked their  own capital  and built  infrastructure have a financial 
stake in their host community, but the Saints and Hornets, as well as most pro-
fessional sports teams in the United States, have few such ties to their local 
communities. Paradoxically, cities have contributed in a very substantial way 
to the incentive for teams to abandon a city in the face of a disaster on the scale 
of Katrina. The owner of the New Orleans Saints was making his way out of 
New Orleans before Katrina, and the storm probably has increased his percep-
tion of risk and diminished his long-term financial prospects in New Orleans 
to a point that it is not in his financial interest to stay there.
New Orleans will be rebuilt at the grassroots home by home and business 
by business. Locational fundamentals may well lead to the restoration of New 
Orleans long term. The rate at which the city is resettled and restored will bear 
on the ability of the NFL Saints and NBA Hornets to generate revenues that will 
encourage them to remain in the community. The Saints and the Hornets have 
invested little in infrastructure, and are motivated in large part by the size of 
future revenue streams in New Orleans relative to other cities that would like 
to host them. The city of New Orleans, on the other hand, has invested sub-
stantially in infrastructure for the teams, and, as a first step found it necessary 
to invest further in that infrastructure necessary to encourage the teams to 
stay. That stay will be short-lived in the absence of the return of the middle 
class so necessary to support the team and give the city any chance to recoup 
its infrastructure investment. To achieve this end, the order of capital expendit-
ures in New Orleans should be levees, housing, middle class amenities, infra-
structure for nonresident businesses, and lastly those industries that cater to 
the entertainment needs of the middle class.
The role of sports in the economic recovery of the city is dubious aside 
from serving as a symbol that the city remains vital. The repair of the Super-
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dome and the New Orleans Arena is an expensive tease in that regard. The in-
vestment in infrastructure does little to provide what is needed for the com-
munity to recover from the storm. Sports and the hosting of mega-events may 
actually undermine longer term recovery through deflecting capital spending 
from where it is needed most and crowding out those workers and residents 
who are involved in the essential rebuilding process. Sports may provide a pleas-
ant recreational amenity to returning residents, but at this juncture hedonic 
value and the economic interests of the sport elites should, out of financial and 
developmental necessity, take a seat on the bench in the interest of the greater 
good.
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